David Forman Seeks a Fort, Sends Intelligence, and Struggles with Militia

In early 1777, David Forman was vested with the power to lead the war effort in Monmouth County. In January, he was commissioned the Colonel of an Additional Regiment of the Continental Army to be stationed in Monmouth County for local defense; in March, he was commissioned Brigadier General of the New Jersey militia with command over Monmouth County’s three militia regiments and the militia from neighboring counties.

The consolidation of power under Forman did not bring military success. The Monmouth Militia suffered its worst defeat of the war at the Battle of Navesink in February and Forman’s men retreated precipitously in March after an ill-considered attack on the British base at Sandy Hook. 

Also in March, Loyalist raiders based on Sandy Hook and Staten Island started attacking the county. With recruiting for his Additional Regiment going badly, disaffection in the militia, and non-functioning local government, David Forman, sought two paths to improve his situation: 1.) by establishing a fort opposite Sandy Hook to improve his defenses and 2.) improving militia performance by requiring officers  to take loyalty oaths.

Establishing a Fort on the Navesink Highlands

On May 27, Forman wrote Richard Peters of Continental Congress about his difficult situation:

With a number not exceeding three hundred men, I have a sea coast of one hundred miles to guard; there are two avenues to Sandy Hook by which they [raiding parties] take a number of stores from the friendly inhabitants of the United States to the enemy.

He then requested artillery to establish a fort on the Navesink Highlands opposite Sandy Hook:

From the situation on the ground, it would be very dangerous to plant guards in there unless some small works were flung up to defend the passes, for which a few pieces of artillery would be absolutely necessary -- four pieces of iron four or three pounders would put it in my power to cut off communications between the Hook and the mainland.

Peters forwarded Forman’s letter to George Washington a few days later. He deferred to Washington as “the best judge” of Forman’s proposal. Peters concluded, “Should you approve of it, the Board will endeavor to comply with the request." But Washington opposed Forman’s proposal. He replied:

If there was any use in Col Forman's having artillery, I could not spare them at this time. But I do not conceive they [cannon] would be of the least service in his situation. If the place is such that he cannot safely plant a guard there for fear of the enemy, he would by the same rule lose his artillery, as he has not men to support them.

Forman sought cannon for a fort again on July 6. This time, he wrote directly to Washington about the difficulty in preventing illegal trade with the British because of the weakness of his position and lack of men. Then he appealed for cannon:

I have pitched a piece of ground so near as to prevent all small pillaging parties [from] coming off [Sandy Hook], and at the same time commands a full prospect of Amboy, Staten Island and the Bay as far as the Narrows. The ground, by nature, is exceedingly strong, a small but steep hill on every side and only to be approached through a plain. A small redoubt with a few pieces of artillery would enable 150 men to maintain it against a large number until the militia could be assembled to relieve the garrison; without [artillery] they will be subject to be surrounded and taken before they could be supported, as was the case last winter [the Battle of the Navesink].

Robert Harrison, an aide de camp to Washington, responded to Forman. "The cannon you request cannot well be shared at this time... they might become the object of enemy's attention and means of drawing a greater part of their forces into the neighborhood of your post.”

The First Intelligence Reports from Monmouth County

While Washington stiff-armed Forman on requested cannon, Continental authorities would become and remain reliant on Forman for intelligence on British movements at Sandy Hook gathered from the Highlands. On April 1, Colonel Asher Holmes (reporting to Forman, militia general) was asked:

I beg you will immediately send proper scouts to South Amboy and Shrewsbury to observe and give intelligence of the motions of the fleet. The persons chosen on this business must be very careful to give & keep a constant look out that their report may be as secret as possible.

The same day, Washington’s aide-de-camp, Aaron Burr, made a similar request of Colonel Samuel Forman (also reporting to David Forman).

But it was David Forman who would forward intelligence reports from Monmouth County. On April 8, General Israel Putnam forwarded to Congress a letter from Forman. Forman reported the departure of a British fleet from Sandy Hook. In it, he boasted, "I shall keep out spies continually and give you the earliest intelligence of the movement of the enemy." Putnam forwarded a second report from Forman on April 13. Forman reported on "a party of British troops were discovered making the Hook to Middletown.” Forman hoped to block the attack: “I shall immediately put myself in their way & attempt to attack them -- at present I am very weak here, my numbers do not exceed 160 rank & file."

On May 20, General John Sullivan directed Forman to “engage some of the inhabitants to pass into Amboy [held by the British] & gain what intelligence you can.” And further, “General Washington recommends that you employ a number of inhabitants to watch the motions of the enemy, both by land and by water." Washington was apparently happy with Forman’s locally-sourced intelligence reports because he ordered Sullivan to provide more on May 29:

You will concert a plan with Col. Forman, or the commanding officer that way, to keep a careful eye and communicate the minutest proceedings. You had better engage some of the inhabitants whose attachments you can be sure of, to watch them and bring expresses [of] whatever they discover… I recommend this mode in preference to employing Light Horsemen because those inhabitants know the country better than they.

On July 10, Forman wrote Washington that “I rode to Shrewsbury and this morning mounted my horse at 2 o'clock and rode down to the heights of Middletown to examine into the state of the enemy's ships” and reported on British ship movements. He sent additional reports on June 20 and 23, the latter informed by the interrogation of a British deserter. Washington summarized Forman’s reports to Congress and Forman sent additional reports on July 20 and July 27.

By early August, Forman understood that Washington would not supply artillery for his proposed fort on the Highlands. No doubt disappointed, Forman stopped traveling there, writing Washington on August 17: “I have lately been afflicted by the Gout & am so blind that I cannot walk without a guide; the infirmities will, I am afraid, disable me to continue in the public service." However, Forman reported in the same letter about the strength of British forces on Staten Island, writing: “From the best accounts I can gather, they have left Staten Island with very few troops to defend it - two small regiments - one British, one Hessian." Of Loyalist forces there, he wrote: "Col [Elisha] Lawrence, late of Monmouth, is stationed at Old Blazing Star ferry - his return of fit for duty at that place on the first of the month was 42 privates - Allen's & Dongan's Regts are somewhat stronger." On August 22, General Sullivan successfully attacked Lawrence on Staten Island, likely acting on Forman’s report.

Unable to build a fort on the Highlands, Forman took two more modest measures. First, he deployed a company of militia to widen “the Gut”—a channel of water created by storms the prior the winter that separated Sandy Hook from the mainland. With the widening of the Gut, Loyalist raiding parties lost a land route to and from Sandy Hook. Second, he established a beacon in spring 1779 on the Highlands. When fired, militia would be alerted without waiting for riders.

Struggles with Militia Officers

Even as Forman was seeking to establish a fort that would give him a defensible place near the British, he was also seeking to purge the county militia of wavering officers. On May 1, Forman called out all militia companies. The muster rolls still exists from the 1st Regiment. Despite being the highest-performing of Monmouth’s three regiments, nearly one third of its men are listed “absconded” on that roll. The muster rolls for the other two regiments no longer exist, but it can be safely assumed that their turnout rate was worse.

Ten days later, George Washington wrote to Governor William Livingston about a letter he received from Forman (Forman’s letter apparently no longer exists). Forman had complained that "the Quakers and disaffected persons are doing all in their power to counteract our Militia Law." He further complained about local leaders who could not be trusted because they had taken British oaths during the Loyalist insurrections months earlier. Washington encouraged Livingston to hold new elections for the officeholders who had taken British oaths. This included militia officers.

Forman and Nathaniel Scudder (serving on the New Jersey Council of Safety at Haddonfield) also exchanged letters. Scudder wrote Forman on May 13: “Am much distressed to hear of the weakness of your posts and the distress of our friends in consequence of the depredations of the enemy." Scudder noted that many militia officers still had not taken Loyalty oaths to the New Jersey government and requested that Forman make them do so.

Throughout the summer, Forman discussed a general call out of the Monmouth militia during which all militia officers would be required to take a Loyalty oath. The hope was that this would surface officers who were disaffected. Based on surviving documents, it appears this plan was never implemented. Problems with militia officer elections and oaths lingered long into the war.

On November 28, Colonel Daniel Hendrickson, leading the Shrewsbury militia, wrote county Clerk Kenneth Anderson about problems with his officers. He noted that his militia "are neglecting choosing militia officers as the law directed, lest it is in my power to appoint & make proper certificates for commissions... It appeared to me that the fourth and sixth company of the 3rd Battalion did not comply with my orders issued for the purpose of electing one Captain, two Lieuts, and one Ensign; pursuant to the laws of this State.” Some companies elected a captain but did not elect other officers.

Disaffection remained a problem in the shore township militias throughout the war though the performance of the Monmouth County militia improved throughout 1777.

Caption: David Forman wanted four cannot to arm a small redoubt on the Navesink Highlands facing British-held Sandy Hook. This redoubt at West Point, NY is like what he hoped to establish.

Related Historic Site: Hartshorne Woods Park

Sources: David Forman to Richard Peters, Neilson Family Papers, box 1, folder: Rutgersania, Rutgers University Special Collections; David Forman to William Livingston, Carl Prince, Papers of William Livingston (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987) vol. 1, pp. 331, 335. New Jersey State Archives, William Livingston Papers, reel 4, May 7, 1777; Nathaniel Scudder to David Forman, Rutgers University Library Special Collections, Neilson Family Papers; David Forman to Board of Ward, Paul Smith, et al, Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774–1789 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1970) vol. 7, p 154 note 2; David Forman, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, Series 4, reel 41, May 27, 1777. Pennsylvania Historical Society, Gratz Coll., case 4, box 11, David Forman; Richard Peters to George Washington, Letters to Delegates of Congress, vol. 7, p155 (www.ammem/amlaw/lwdg.html); Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(gw080179)); David Forman to George Washington, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, Series 4, reel 42, July 6, 1777; Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, Series 4, reel 42, July 7, 1777; John Neilson to Asher Holmes, Monmouth County Historical Association, Cherry Hall Papers, box 15, folder 9; Aaron Burr to Samuel Forman, David Library of the American Revolution, Aaron Burr Papers, reel 1, #205; General Israel Putnam to Congress, National Archives, Papers of the Continental Congress, M247, I159, Letters from General Officers, p57; Israel Putnam to Congress, National Archives, Papers of the Continental Congress, M247, I159, Letters from General Officers, p67; John Sullivan to David Forman, Neilson Family Papers, box 1, folder: Rutgersania, Rutgers University Special Collections; George Washington to John Sullivan, in ed Hammond, Otis G., ed. The Letters and Papers of Major-General John Sullivan, Continental Army. 3 vols. (Concord, N.H., New Hampshire Historical Society, 1930-1939) vol. 1, p 345; David Forman to George Washington, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, Series 4, General Correspondence; David Forman, letters, National Archives, Papers of the Continental Congress, reel 93, item 78, vol. 9, #101, 103. Washington’s summary of Forman’s intelligence is printed in The Remembrancer or Impartial Repository of Public Events for 1777 (London: John Almon, 1778) v5, p270; David Forman to George Washington, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, Series 4, reel 42, July 20 and July 23, 1777; David Forman to George Washington, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, Series 4, reel 43, August 17, 1777; Daniel Hendrickson to Kenneth Anderson, New Jersey State Archives, Dept. of Defense, Revolutionary War, Numbered Manuscripts, #1063.