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British Army Boards Ships Via Sandy Hook

by Michael Adelberg

British Army Boards Ships Via Sandy Hook

Captain Henry Duncan of the Royal Navy captained one of the ships that covered the British Army as it marched onto Sandy Hook and then transported the Army to New York.

- July 1778 -

Even before the Battle of Monmouth, British leaders determined that the best route to safety in New York was via Sandy Hook. The peninsula at the northeast tip of Monmouth County was taken by the British navy in April 1776, and attempts to dislodge the British in June 1776 and March 1777 were easily turned back. Following the Battle of Monmouth (June 28), the British Army took a week to march 25 miles through Middletown to the Navesink Highlands. Here, they would cross to safety on the Hook.


Still, marching 12,000 soldiers with their camp followers, baggage train, and livestock onto the narrow peninsula was a huge task—one made more complicated by the peninsula being turned into an island by an enormous winter storm. Admiral Richard Howe, commanding the Royal Navy at New York, wrote of the job at hand: March the Army “over a Bridge formed with the Flat-Boats across the Channel which had been made by the sea last Winter, and separated the peninsula of Sandy Hook from the Main."


Crossing “the Gut” onto Sandy Hook

The British fleet would have to create a bridge across “the Gut” (the waterway between Sandy Hook and the mainland), cover the troops as they came across the open egress, and then transport the Army from Sandy Hook to New York. The available ships were not initially up to the task. On July 1, Captain Henry Duncan, commanding a warship at New York, wrote: "our ships, in general, were very indifferently manned, owing to sickness and being short of their compliment."


That same day, engineers at Sandy Hook constructed a pontoon bridge across the Gut by lining up boats and laying boards across them. German Officer Johann Hinrich wrote:


Today, the baggage was brought to the bay at Sandy Hook in order to be embarked. We waited in this position, formed in a crescent for an attack from the enemy but no one appeared before our outposts except Morgan's Corps [Daniel Morgan].


The pontoon bridge was constructed before the end of July 2. It was sturdy but narrow. The German officer, Templehoffe, wrote the bridge made the Gut “passable only by a narrow bridge of boats, which not more than six men a‑breast could pass."


General Archibald Robertson wrote on July 1 that he “began to take the artillery to the beach." On July 2, he wrote: "All the provision train wagons embark'd & a number of horse swam the gut across to Sandy Hook." Captain Duncan wrote that the Army "began to embark the baggage & swim the horses across the Hook." He also recorded that only three ships were at the Hook—not nearly enough to carry the Army to New York.


On the Navesink Highlands, tents and provisions were sent off before the men. The German officer, Captain Weiderholdt, recalled “days of rest since all the baggage went to Sandy Hook for shipment” but, as a result, the men now lived in a “primitive encampment, consisting of twig huts because our tents were shipped with the baggage." Another German officer, Johann Ewald, was also miserable. He wrote:


We were so terribly bitten by the mosquitoes and other kinds of vermin that we could not open our eyes from the swelling on our faces. Many men were made almost unrecognizable, and our bodies looked like those people who have suddenly been attacked by measles or small pox.


After artillery and baggage, the horses went next. But many of the horses were weakened from the long campaign, heat, and insufficient forage. While horses were a valuable resource, the decision was made to leave behind any horse in a compromised condition. On July 2, General James Pattison wrote:


From the difficulty of transporting the horse & probably scarcity of forage, I was under necessity, by direction of Sir Henry Clinton, of leaving about 70 of the worst artillery horses behind, the Quarter Master General having the same reason, left three or four hundred.


Pattison noted that the horses were "turned loose in the woods." Just a day later, the Quartermaster General William Erskine, realizing the mistake, sent George Taylor, Colonel of a non-existent Loyalist militia, to round up the salvageable horses being left behind: "Colonel George Taylor has the Commander in Chief's permission to take up these horse wherever he can find them." Taylor’s party took some horses and killed many others. Colonel John Laurens of the Continental Army later reported that Taylor’s Loyalists “cut the throats of a great many horses.”


By the end of July 3, General Robertson, noted that "all the baggage of the Army embark'd" and then on July 4 "the Dragoons, bat horses, light baggage, etc. etc. etc., all got off." This happened amidst terrible weather.  Lt Colonel Francis Downman wrote that on July 3, "it rained very hard the greater part of the day, the embarkation of stores and baggage, however, went on, as did the transportation of horses to Sandy Hook by swimming them over a passage of about 50 or 60 yards of breadth." On July 4th, the rain continued. British soldiers heard cannon fire in the distance—not from hostilities, but from the Continental Army’s Independence Day celebrations.


The movement of the Army onto Sandy Hook was completed on July 5. General Robertson remembered the march of the remainder of the British Army on the morning of July 5: “Early, the Army marched in four columns and got over the bridge of boats into the Hook by 10 o'clock without a shot being fired." Men on Sandy Hook started loading onto boats bound for the transport ships anchored offshore.


Lieutenant Stephen Jarvis, a Loyalist cavalryman, wrote:


The army continued its march, the [Queen's] Rangers bringing up the rear. The army crossed over a pontoon bridge to Light House Island. The Queen's Rangers embarked in flat bottomed boats and rowed up to New York.


Weiderholdt wrote of moving the horses that were not previously transported:


The horses and cows were tied up, 8 or 9 together, four men got into a boat, tied a rope to the boat and rowed off, this way the horses & cows had to swim over... we laid all night in the sand by the light house.


John Montressor, an engineer on Sandy Hook, wrote of General Henry Clinton's arrival on Sandy Hook: "He [Clinton] was saluted by the guns from the forts as he left with the Army at the Neversink in New Jersey." Clinton, himself, reported: "Preparations were made for passing Sandy Hook Island by a bridge, which by the extraordinary efforts of our Navy were soon completed."


The Sandy Hook Encampment and Embarkation

On Sandy Hook, accommodations were no better than at the miserable Navesink camp. Potable water was scarce. Montressor wrote on July 3 that "the heat so extraordinary this morning that five or six persons fell dead principally by drinking [bad] water." German Officer Jacob Piel called Sandy Hook "this sandy wasteland." Lt. John Von Krafft noted the need to forage for his own food while on Sandy Hook, “I dug up some fine large clams on the beach, a thing I had learned from the English and I immediately ate them with ravenous appetite owing to my hunger.”


From a distance, the red lines of men marching across the Gut must have been an extraordinary sight. Locals came onto the Navesink Highlands to watch. A Continental Army officer, Parke Custis, wrote: "The number, order and regularity of the boats, and the splendid appearance of the troops, rendered this embarkation one of the most brilliant and imposing spectacles of the Revolutionary War." Grenadier John Peebles, however, was not impressed, “deep sand... a very irregular & ill-managed embarkation."


British leaders worried little about the vulnerability of the Army as it crossed onto Sandy Hook. Admiral Howe noted that "the Enemy desisted from every purpose of further obstruction.” But junior officers on Sandy Hook were less sure. Lieutenant Von Krafft worried that the transport ships were “without guns.” He further wrote:


I was greatly surprised that the Rebels did not take advantage of the disorder in our arrangement and crossing since we were without cannons and even our muskets were unloaded... They would have succeeded since we were too confident.


From Sandy Hook, the men were ferried on flatboats to transport ships. This occurred on July 5 and July 6. Captain Duncan noted that the same British flatboats that were used to form the pontoon bridge across the Gut were now used to ferry men from Sandy Hook to the ships. “Made a bridge of the flat boats across the gully that separated the Hook from the Neversink, over which the army marched with great ease -- Took away the boats, and embarked the troops from the Hook.”


In keeping with the previous two weeks, boarding the ships at Sandy Hook—the last leg of the Monmouth Campaign—was difficult. Lt. Von Krafft described the difficulties. The men had to “wade through water up to our knees” to get into the boats. And because there were not enough boats, there was no room for animals. They “were tied to them [the boats] so as to swim behind.” The loaded boats moved slowly to the transport ships which “lay at quite a distance [from shore].  We had to row nearly an hour and a half before we reached it.” Once on board, the men had no food: “We made a great noise there because there were no provisions on board and no one knew where to get any.” Von Krafft’s complete account is in the appendix of this article.


As the British completed the Monmouth Campaign, Henry Clinton and a few other senior leaders wrote of their success. The British Army had marched across New Jersey facing various harassments, miserable weather, and a Continental Army attack. It achieved its strategic goal of reaching New York. But other officers understood the campaign very differently. Estimates of losses through desertion varied from 500 to 1,500. Stephen Kemble worried about "the great irregularities of the Army during the march." Francis Downman worried about the hostility of the locals and concluded it “was a most fatiguing march.”


The British Army had earned a rest. For the British navy, however, their troubles were just beginning. In less than a week, a large French fleet would anchor just outside Sandy Hook.


Related Historical Site: Sandy Hook Lighthouse


Appendix

Journal of Lieutenant John Charles Philip von Krafft, July 5, 1778:

At 5am we marched forth about – English miles in the neighborhood of – where we soon marched up to the water, for we had left camp by the left flank. Some companies of the Body Regiment and also the first two files of the Body Company of our regiment had already embarked in long boats. Many of these boats were also used for the transportation of animals which were tied to them so as to swim behind. Therefore we went back again and to the right across a pontoon bridge made of boats covered with boards, across which all the Engineer regiments had marched also. We had to follow them to the little island of Sandy Hook upon which stands the lighthouse for the ships. We had difficulty marching through the sand almost as far as the lighthouse, which is situated at the extreme [north] end of the island. Here we immediately went into the long boats, having, however, to wade through water up to our knees, because it was high tide. From the pontoon bridge to this place was a distance of – English miles, the time of our arrival, after 11am. Our ship, which we and the Body Company had to get to by means of two long boats for each, was three-masted, without guns and named - It lay at quite a distance [from shore].  We had to row nearly an hour and a half before we reached it and we made a great noise there because there were no provisions on board and no one knew whereto get any. Someone was sent to other ships for provisions [for us]. There is yet to be mentioned that, when we were crossing the pontoon bridge, I was greatly surprised that the Rebels did not take advantage of the disorder in our arrangement and crossing since we were without cannons and even our muskets were unloaded, according to orders received the night before. They would have succeeded since we were too confident. During a momentary detention near the water I dug up some fine large clams on the beach, a thing I had learned from the English and I immediately ate them with ravenous appetite owing to my hunger. Before we crossed the pontoon bridge all unnecessary horses were turned loose and chased back into the country.


Sources: Henry Duncan is quoted in John Laughton, The Naval Miscellany (Naval Record Society, 1952) pp. 159-60; Andrew D. Mellick, Jr., Lesser Crossroads, ed. Hubert G. Schmidt from Andrew D. Mellick, Jr., The Story of an Old Farm (1889 reprint) (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1948), pp. 262-4; Gen. James Pattison, Monmouth Battlefield State Park, Battle of Monmouth files: folder - British Sources; C.W. Heckert, The Diary of Captain Weiderholdt (Buckhannon, WV: CW Heckert, 1984), p10; Colin Lindsay, Extracts of Colonel Templehoffe's History of the Seven Years War (London: T. Cadel, 1793), v2, p484; Montresor, John. “Journals of Captain John Montresor.” Edited by G. D. Scull. (New York: Collections of the New-York Historical Society, 1881) p 502; William Erskine to George Taylor, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Treasury, Class 1, vol 634, folio 187; Johann Ewald, Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979) p 137-8; Moss, George H., Jr. Another Look at Nauvoo to the Hook, (Sea Bright: Ploughshare Press, 1990) pp. 18-9; Francis Downman, The Services of Lieut. Colonel Francis Downman (London: Royal Artillery Institution, 1898) p64-72; New York Historical Society, MSS Microfilms, reel 17, Stephen Jarvis Autobiography, p 30; John Laurens, The Army correspondence of Colonel John Laurens in the years 1777-8 (New York: New York Times, 1969) pp. 204-5; Jacob Piel quoted in Bruce Burgoyne, Defeat, Disaster and Dedication: The Diaries of a Hessian Officer (NY: Heritage Books, 1997) p32-3;  John Peebles' American War, 1776-1782 (Stackpole Books) p196; Stephen Kemble, The Kemble Papers (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Library, 2009) vol. 1, pp. 602-3; George Washington Parke Custis, Recollections and Private Memoirs of Washington (Philadelphia: J. Bradley, 1861) p 30; Bruce Burgoyne, Journal of the Hesse Cassel Jaeger Corps (NY: Heritage Books, 1994) p47; John Knox Laughton, "Journal of Capt. Henry Duncan" in Publications of the Naval Records Society, vol. 20, 1920, p169-70; Lt. Wiedenholdt, Journal, New Jersey State Archives, Revolutionary War, Manuscripts Coll., box 2, #11; John Von Krafft, Journal of John Charles Philip Von Krafft, 1776-1784 (New York: Privately Printed, 1888) pp. 51-52; Adm Richard Howe, Naval Documents of the American Revolution (Naval History Foundation: Washington DC, 2018) vol 13, p 285; Capt. Henry Duncan, Naval Documents of the American Revolution (Naval History Foundation: Washington DC, 2018) vol 13, p 267.

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